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TIMOTHY BESLEY*
The London School of Economics
The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general
history. An enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the
economic bleeding which the needs of the state necessitates, and from
the use to which the results are put. 
Joseph Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State”, 1917/18, page 100
I INTRODUCTION
The above quote is from an article by Schumpeter which is often thought ofas one of the founding articles in the field of fiscal sociology. I am fairly
certain that many economists, even those who work in the field of public
finance, have not engaged very much with the issues that Schumpeter raises
here. It is worth bearing in mind he wrote the words above in an era when it
was common for governments of the most prosperous countries to raise around
10 per cent of GDP in taxes. Even then, the question that pre-occupied
Schumpeter was whether and how revenues on that scale were sustainable.
This requires a proper appreciation of the economic, social and political forces
that make tax raising possible. 
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* I am grateful to Torsten Persson for many discussions on the topic of this lecture which draws
heavily on our joint research. However, he is not to blame for some of the more speculative
comments.
Email: t.besley@lse.ac.uk
01 Besley article (Geary Lecture)_ESRI Vol 44-3  20/09/2013  10:13  Page 297
If we fast forward to the end of the century, levels of taxation in the
developed world had typically risen four-fold expressed as a share of national
income. But this seems to be acknowledged with little comment in mainstream
public economics.1 When I studied public finance as a student a quarter of
century ago, it was largely taken for granted. The main focus at the time was
how to use tax raising powers in an “optimal way” rather than a concern about
what made such taxes feasible in the first place. 
Economics is full of unacknowledged assumptions. Another example is
how textbooks frequently characterise the ideal of a “laissez faire” market
economy where, in fact, governments are needed to play an extensive role in
enforcing contracts and property rights. A quick look around the world today
and at historical experience reveals that this is a pretty demanding
assumption to begin with. As in the case of taxation, understanding it requires
exploring both the technical capacity of governments and its motives. In such
cases, the risk is that what becomes the focus of economic analysis can look
second order compared to the more dramatic variations revealed by history
and global comparisons.
In these and other contexts, I am reminded of the well-known quote from
Mark Twain:
It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you
know for sure that just ain’t so.
There are good reasons to think that this quote should be on every policy-
maker’s door, particularly any policymaker who lived through the recent
economic crisis. But there is also no harm in having economists engage in a bit
of soul-searching on that basis too. 
What is all too comfortable in economics is to focus on small variations in
outcomes and experience in the belief that there is a natural state which is
pretty good and to which we will return in short order. And, of course, most of
the time, events seem to confirm that. But there are two reasons to step out of
the comfort zone. The first is historical, realising that many of the things that
we study are comparatively recent. So the wider historical experience is
frequently dismissed as irrelevant in modern times. The other is that many
economists inhabit the hermetically sealed world of functional and well-
performing economies, forgetting the experience and lessons from the
developing world where poverty is entrenched by social, economic and political
forces. Thus, most public finance economists study economies where there is
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only a small range of variation. The question is how far this could lead them
to be making assumptions about things that “just ain’t so”. 
Here, I want to unpack some of the unwritten assumptions in discussions
about the design of tax systems. These mainly concern social and political
forces that underpin such systems. However, it also means giving greater
prominence than economists often give to the role of enforcement and
compliance. I will begin the paper with a look at some facts which provide a
useful backdrop and which are taken from a recent article on taxation and
development prepared for the new volume of the Handbook of Public
Economics written jointly with Torsten Persson (Besley and Persson, 2013). 
When historians look back at the twentieth century I suspect that a major
theme will be the remarkable transformation of the role of the state. The
significant increase in public revenues referred to above reflects a broad
acceptance that the state needs high levels of resources to support its spending
plans. During this period government has gone from a preoccupation with
spending on infrastructure and defence towards creating welfare states,
building transfer, social insurance, education and health systems. 
Figure 1 illustrates this using data for the twentieth century from Mitchell
(2007a, b, c). It takes a sample of 18 countries for which we believe that there
are broadly comparable tax data for the twentieth century. The countries in
this sample are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The
solid line in the figure illustrates how the average tax take has increased over
time from around 10 per cent in national income to around 25 per cent in the
sample as a whole which combines a range of high and middle income
countries. 
Equally striking in Figure 1 is the increased reliance on income taxation
which is illustrated by the dotted line. Income taxation made up about 5 per
cent of revenues in 1900 but about 50 per cent by the end of the last century.
There were particularly sharp increases in the income tax share during the
two world wars. Moreover, there appears to have been a “ratchet effect” with
these shares remaining high even after the conflict ended. This is consistent
with a view, developed below, that this development was driven by
investments in fiscal capacity that remained in place after conflict ended. A
case in point is the introduction and wider use of income tax withholding from
the pay packets of employees. 
Data like those in Figure 1 provide a natural platform for thinking about
the future. The question of how governments raise sufficient revenues to
support their spending ambitions is important when governments around the
world are raising such significant amounts of debt. While a lot of this stress is
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due to the post-2008 downturn, it brings into sharp relief some of the longer-
term spending challenges which governments face as populations age and as
countries compete to attract mobile firms and individuals. And that is
assuming that the political and social forces that fostered the creation of the
modern fiscal state stay in place. 
Another important background issue concerns the prospects for building
the European Union as a fiscal state. At present sovereign tax raising power
resides with member states and has created challenges in trying to resolve
fiscal crises in the Eurozone. Understanding the forces that have shaped the
emergence of tax raising power throughout history serves as a useful backdrop
to these debates. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next step is to discuss
the background facts in a little more detail. I then introduce the idea of
investments in fiscal capacity as a means of understanding this drawing on
my recent work with Torsten Persson. I will then look at challenges for the
future suggested by the approach. Finally, I will offer some concluding
comments.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Tax Revenue and Income Tax for a Sample of 
Eighteen Countries
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II MAKING TAX SYSTEMS I: SOME STYLISED FISCAL FACTS
In this section, I review a few further background facts developed in
Besley and Persson (2013) and Besley, Ilzetzki and Persson (2013). I present
these in the form of five core fiscal facts illustrated by both time-series and
cross-section data. These facts tee up the discussion that follows and provide
a framework for thinking about what might be going on behind the scenes.
Fiscal Fact I: Rich countries collect a much larger share of their income in
taxes than do poor countries.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 where the left panel plots the overall tax
take as a share of GDP from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) against the log of
GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables, both measured around the year
2000, and distinguishes observations by income.2 The right-hand panel looks
at the same relationship instead using the time-series data on our sample of
18 countries from Mitchell (2007a, b, c) to plot five-year averages of the tax
share over the twentieth century against national income from Maddison’s
data,3 and distinguishing observations by time period. The cross-section and
time-series patterns look very similar although there is a wide variation in
country experiences. Higher-income countries raise more in tax revenue than
poorer countries. Furthermore, the tax share in GDP of today’s developing
countries does not look very different from the tax take 100 years ago in those
that are now developed. 
Below, I will argue that there are economic, political and social
determinants of these profound changes.
Fiscal Fact II: Rich countries rely to a much larger extent on income taxes
as opposed to trade taxes than do poor countries.
When it comes to tax administration, trade taxes and income taxes
constitute two polar cases. Collecting trade taxes only requires being able to
observe trade flows at major shipping ports. Although such taxes may
encourage smuggling, detecting and collecting revenue owed is a much easier
proposition than collecting income taxes. The latter requires major invest -
ments in enforcement and compliance structures throughout the entire
economy. One way of looking at the capacity of a tax system is, therefore, to
look at the balance of trade and income taxes holding total tax revenue
constant. 
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This is illustrated in Figure 3 which, like the earlier Figure, reports the
cross-sectional pattern for the year 2000, based on Baunsgaard and Keen
(2005) in addition to the time-series pattern for last 100 years based on
historical data for 18 countries from Mitchell (2007a, b, c). The income-tax
share is displayed on the vertical axis, and the trade-tax share on the
horizontal axis. There is a pronounced negative correlation so that countries
that rely more on income seem to rely less on trade taxes. The left panel also
illustrates a clear-cut pattern by income with high-income countries
depending more on income taxes. In middle-income and, more especially, low-
income countries there is greater dependence on trade taxes. The right-hand
panel of Figure 3 shows that this move from trade towards income taxes is also
seen in the historical development of tax systems as countries develop. The
cross-sectional and time-series patterns therefore paint a similar picture. 
Fiscal Fact III: High-tax countries rely to a much larger extent on income
taxes compared to low-tax countries.
We focus on this fact in Figure 4 which plots the relationship between the
share of income taxes in total taxes and income per capita, in the current cross
sectional data for 2000 as well as the historical time series for our sample of
18 countries. The left-hand panel uses three groups of countries by tax take:
countries that raise more than 25 per cent of taxes in GDP, countries that raise
15-25 per cent of taxes in GDP, and countries that raise less than 15 per cent.
The countries in the high-tax group look different since they raise a signifi -
cantly higher portion of their tax revenues in the form of income taxes. The
right-hand panel also separates the observations by time period. Once again,
this shows that the historical trend in this sample of older nations and the
pattern across the world more recently look rather similar.
This fact is interesting as it makes us think about the forces that allow the
growth of income taxes in the economy given that income taxes, along with
VAT, now do so much of the heavy-lifting in funding government spending.
Fiscal Fact IV: Differences in tax take are primarily due to the breadth of
the tax base and compliance rather than statutory tax rates.
Another indicator of the government’s power to tax can be gauged from the
relationship between statutory tax rates and the actual tax take.
Governments with a more effective tax machinery will be able to raise higher
revenues from a similar tax structure. Figure 5 presents the evidence by
plotting the top statutory income tax rates in the 1990s for a sample of 
67-countries in Gordon and Lee (2005) against the share of income taxes in 
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GDP from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). Figure 5 shows that the distribution
of the top statutory rate is about the same amongst high-income and low-
income countries. The figure does not directly take coverage and progressivity
into account. However, the fact that high-income countries raise much more
income-tax revenue than low-income countries suggests that it is the
narrowness of the tax base in low-income countries which lies behind this.
Thus the growth in the breadth of the base and the compliance measures
needed for this is a key focus on understanding changes in the tax system. 
Fiscal Fact V: Countries with strong executive constraints collect higher tax
revenues, when income per capita is held constant, than do countries with weak
executive constraints.
We now turn to politics and its link to tax collection. In particular, we will
relate it to the strength of political institutions. The latter is measured by an
indicator of the strength of executive constraints from the well-known Polity
IV data base.4 We use the highest value of this variable as coded in the data
4 See Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010).
Figure 5
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to measure the proportion of years since independence (or since 1800 if
independence is earlier) that a country had strong constraints on the
executive.5 Executive constraints are frequently used as way of capturing how
much executive authority requires consent from other institutions such as a
legislature.
Figure 6 plots a partial correlation between tax revenues and constraints
while controlling for current income and shows a clear positive correlation
between this measure of political institutions and fiscal capacity, controlling
for the level of economic development.6 The interpretation of this will be
discussed further below when I look at hypotheses for why the size of the tax
take grew during the twentieth century. 
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Figure 6: Partial Correlation of Executive Constraints and Fiscal Capacity
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III MAKING TAX SYSTEMS II: UNDERSTANDING STATE CAPACITY
The facts that we have discussed lead naturally to the question of why
things changed so dramatically over the twentieth century and across the
nations of the world. Of course, there is no simple answer. There is a web of
interdependent causality linking an array of factors which are hard to
disentangle both theoretically and empirically. There is probably enough here
for a lifetime of research rather than a single paper. 
My more modest aim in this section is to suggest a framework for thinking
about some of these issues. The aim is to strip away a lot of the complexity and
to highlight some factors that are likely to be important with a view to
providing some building blocks for our thinking. It will be organised around
the core concept of investments in fiscal capacity. Besley and Persson (2009,
2011, 2013) use the term “fiscal capacity” to capture the consequences of an
array of investments in the state that made such increases on taxation
feasible. They argue that many of the trends described above can be thought
of as being the result of purposeful investments to increase the ability to raise
tax revenues through establishing better record keeping, monitoring and
compliance. This is particularly evident, for example, in the case of income
taxes. 
In what follows, I will offer a stylised account of their framework which
emphasises the role of economics, politics and social forces in shaping such
investments. 
3.1 Economics
Many developments in the economy change the ability of the state to tax.
The standard economic approach to taxation and economic development
focuses on how economic change influences the evolution of the tax system. A
central role in this is structural change which lowers the cost of raising taxes
and extends the range of taxation. Chief among these is a widening role of the
formal market economy. A vast amount of the tax that is transmitted to
government in the modern state is from larger formal-sector firms. This would
be true, for example, for both the personal income tax and VAT. The problem
of informality in developing countries is very similar to the compliance issues
that arise with self-employment in developed economies. For the latter, it is
notoriously difficult to observe flows of income and expenditures. However,
self-employment tends to be relatively less important than formal employment
by a firm in modern economies. 
Two other related developments in the economy facilitate taxation.7 The
first is the need for businesses to use transparent accounting procedures. This
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is often a by-product of raising outside capital where lenders and/or
shareholders demand accurate assessments of the financial position of firms.
This creates a framework for transparent statement of profits and losses for
tax purposes including accurate measurement of the wage bill. Alongside this,
the growth of financial transactions through the payment system facilitates
greater monitoring compared to cash transactions which are easier to keep
outside of the tax net. Both of these suggest that there should be a strong
correlation between the power to tax and the development of a modern
financial sector. And there is a natural complementarity between the two
given that common forms of record-keeping and monitoring are used.
This standard economic approach also studies the influence of the tax
system on the economy. Well-designed tax systems can minimise the efficiency
losses imposed by taxes and even raise the growth rate in endogenous-growth
models. Tax revenues can be spent on market supporting and market
augmenting public goods. Moreover, governments may have a stronger
interest in building infrastructure when there is a dividend in the form of
greater tax revenues.
Economic approaches to the growth of taxation have also dealt with the
issues of administration and compliance directly.8 A greater reliance on trade
taxes (and seignorage) compared to income taxes that we noted above is a
reflection of this. And governments tend to build more professionalised
revenue services which facilitate auditing alongside developments in the
economy. Moreover, these need to keep up with developments in evasion and
avoidance “technologies” as new ways are found of hiding transactions or
building tax “efficient” vehicles to reduce tax liabilities. This game of cat and
mouse requires an eternally vigilant revenue service.
Even though revenues tend to rise with economic growth due to higher
income and expenditure, the translation of economic growth into higher tax
revenues is more than mechanical. Adopting broader tax bases for income and
value added taxes, is only feasible if growth is accompanied by investments in
compliance. Understanding why this is the case requires a focus on the
incentives of government to build tax systems. 
3.2 Politics
The political economy dimension is also important in understanding
motives to raise tax revenues. There are large differences in political
institutions across countries and there have been important developments
over time. To illustrate this, Figure 7 looks at developments in institutions
along two dimensions in the Polity IV data base for the sample of 18 countries
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for which we have consistent tax data for the twentieth century. The first
dimension is strong executive constraints in the data and the other is
openness of executive recruitment.9
Figure 7 shows that there has been an increase in the fraction of countries
that are classified as having open access to power and strong executive
constraints over the century, albeit with a reversal during the second world
war period. Of course this correlation with increased tax raising over the
period is not proof of causation. But it is important to bear in mind that two
things are going on side-by-side. Over the whole time period, having strong
executive constraints is less prevalent than high openness although by the end
of the twentieth century century all countries in this sample had strong
executive constraints and openness of executive recruitment. 
The use of these two measures reflects the fact that political institutions
play two key roles. First, they regulate access to power – deciding who governs
and on what terms. Our measure of openness of executive recruitment tries to
get at this. The growth of electoral democracy creates a greater role for
electoral motives which may widen the incentive for politicians to appeal to
the mass electorate by offering more public services. Taxation needs to be
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9 Specifically, in terms of the Polity IV database, I use xconst=7 to indicate strong executive
constraints and xropen=4 to indicate openness.
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raised to support these ambitions. Second, political institutions shape how
power is used once it is acquired. The growth of executive constraints over
time has made it more and more difficult for incumbents to wield power
unchecked. This encourages adopting spending programmes which have wide
benefits and this complements the electoral motive mentioned above. 
So, at least, in theory, there are reasons to expect the process of widening
access to and constraining power to lead to greater demands on the state and
to encourage an increase in fiscal capacity all else equal (see Besley and
Persson, 2009, for a model). This can be seen by thinking of an incumbent
government that is contemplating making investments that will have a
sustained effect on the fiscal capacity of an economy. Greater constraints on
executive power should make it more likely that that these future tax
revenues will be used for common purposes and Besley and Persson (2009) and
Besley, Persson and Ilzetzki (2013) show in different ways that there is a
robust positive correlation between executive constraints and the level of
taxation in both cross-section and time-series data. Openness is more
ambiguous since greater openness could create political instability which can
shorten the time horizons of incumbents.  The empirical pattern is less clear-
cut in respect of this factor.
Although not necessarily measured by Polity IV’s notion of executive
constraints, a key part of the political economy of taxation and in creating the
preconditions for investment in fiscal capacity is improving the scrutiny of
how tax proceeds are used. In theory, this should help to increase efficiency by
reducing waste as well as reducing corruption. Polities that have strong media
and open government should achieve more reassurance that the proceeds of
taxation are being well-used and this should provide a further boost to the
motives for investing in fiscal capacity.
The political economy approach emphasises that tax compliance is more
than a technical issue. It also chimes well with historical accounts of the
growth in fiscal capacity such as Brewer (1989); Bonney (1999); Dincecco
(2011) and O’Brien (2001). Dincecco (2011) emphasises that a key step towards
building fiscal capacity has been by building more centralised fiscal power
alongside centralised political power, the history of France being an important
example. The history of the US also largely supports an increasing role for
federal over more localised forms of fiscal capacity by states and
municipalities. And this is what theoretical considerations suggest would give
the strongest incentives to build fiscal capacity. One issue is that more
decentralised fiscal systems create incentives for the tax base to migrate
across jurisdictions. This is combatted by sending fiscal authority to the
centre. By and large, we now see developed economies dominated by nation
states with centralised tax setting authority. 
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Political scientists and sociologists sometimes push the role of taxation in
development even further, by arguing that taxation can be a catalyst for
political and economic change. The old American adage of “no taxation without
representation” is a vivid instance of such thinking, whereby demands for
transparency and representation are built as part of the need to build a strong
fiscal state in a “fiscal contract” between the citizens and the state: see, in
particular, Levi (1988). On this account, there would be a feedback from
taxation to political reform with countries that have invested in fiscal capacity
having a stronger incentive to strengthen political institutions.
3.3 Common Interests
In the background in this discussion is the question of the interests that
citizens have in how the state is used. One question is whether the society is
fractured in what it wants government to be used for or is there a strong sense
of common interest. 
Debates about role of war in supporting the growth of tax systems, such as
in Tilly (1990), can be thought of in such terms. The need to fight an enemy
becomes a way of recognising a common purpose for which revenue is needed.
Throughout much of history, government spending was dominated by
servicing military requirements. In more recent times, the role of war has
been superseded by the introduction of  broad-based programmes in welfare
states. To the extent that these are used and valued by the vast majority of the
population, they provide a basis for supporting high levels of taxation. 
This will be facilitated to the extent that there is a common view of priorities.
This, of course, is reinforced by having political institutions that reinforce 
the promotion of these collective interests. But the preconditions need to be
there.
Common interests could be fostered by a strong sense of national identity
in nation states. Mythologies and realities created around wars and
significant historical events can play a role in this as argued, for example, by
Anderson (1991). To the extent that people feel bound by common ties, it
should be easier to implement social programmes that involve some element
of redistribution. Common norms of fairness and distribution may also play a
role in supporting greater acceptance of state programmes. Alesina and Glaser
(2006) argue that this could explain why the US has not adopted a European-
style welfare state.  
The flip side of this is the possibility that polarised societies are likely to
find it harder to achieve such common purpose. Such polarisation can have its
roots in ethnic, religious and/or class differences. Besley and Persson (2011)
find consistent evidence that the level of fiscal capacity is negatively
correlated with country-level measures of ethnic polarisation in a cross-section
312 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
01 Besley article (Geary Lecture)_ESRI Vol 44-3  20/09/2013  10:13  Page 312
of countries. In addition to making it more difficult to gain acceptance for
universal programmes, such societies may also have stronger social capital
making it easier to provide public goods via social networks. In such cases,
public goods provision through the state will be of lesser interest. Reflecting
this, Esping-Andersen (1999) has argued that countries with strong family
ties invest less in a welfare state. 
3.4 Social Norms
As well as influencing the way that the state is used social forces can also
be important in affecting tax compliance. There is now an extensive literature,
reviewed in Torgler (2007), which looks at the economics of “tax morale”, in
particular the social and psychological forces that facilitate tax compliance.
Early efforts to model compliance looked predominantly at the trade-off that
would arise in a game of cat and mouse between tax authorities and citizens
based on the probability of being caught for non-compliance. This led to a focus
on information flows and detection technologies. However, acts of compliance
often look voluntary relative to such detection probabilities. 
This literature suggests a role for social norms in creating a culture of
compliance. Quite where these come from is, however, open to debate. One
view is to consider them strategically as part of a wider social contract. So
citizens pay their taxes so long as the state is spending on some pre-agreed set
of purposes. Non-compliance becomes a form of protest. One example of this in
the UK was the fiscal anarchy unleashed by the Thatcher government when it
tried to replace rates with a poll tax as a means of funding local government.
An otherwise broadly compliant population undermined the system by
refusing to pay in larger numbers. But another interpretation of compliance
norms sees them as part of a socialisation process in which paying taxes
becomes a reflex as natural as blinking. Such views have to entertain the
possibility that preferences are shaped by social forces so that people would
rather comply than not, even when they could gamble on not being caught. 
Either way, the idea that there is a framework of norms which support tax
systems is attractive and maintaining such norms is certainly a challenge for
the future of tax systems as I will discuss further below.  
3.5 Common Interest States
Putting this discussion together, we now have a way of thinking about the
collection of countries which over the twentieth century grew their fiscal
capacities. The approach that I have sketched suggests that this is the product
of investments in fiscal capacity which are the combined product of political
change, creating universal spending programmes based on common interests,
social norms to support compliance and promoting economic development.
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This has resulted in levels of fiscal capacity of 40 per cent of national income
or even higher. The emergence of these states relies on keeping rent-seeking
and corruption at a low enough level and recognising the virtues of
universalistic public programmes underpinned by broad-based political
coalitions. Taxes that support such spending are typically broad-based and
progressive and supported by strong norms of compliance as well as formal
monitoring. 
Besley and Persson (2011) refer to such states as common interest states.
Of course, this description is just an “ideal type” and there is considerable
variation in the exact organisation of the state and the institutions that
support high investment in fiscal capacity. Each country has its own unique
history and circumstances that would defy any simple and stylised
characterisation and there is variation in the outcomes. For example, the USA
has not made a commitment to publicly-funded universal health care nor does
it have VAT which makes it rather unusual among developed economies. But
on a global scale, it is still a fairly high tax country with a state that performs
a wide range of functions.
It is tempting to view common-interest states as the terminal product in
an evolutionary process to which the whole world will eventually converge.
But it would be bold indeed to make such a claim. There seems at present little
pressure for fundamental change among the countries that have trodden this
path even though all are grappling with challenges that such states bring. And
a country like Greece is displaying particular signs of fragility. However,
arguably it was deficient prior to the crisis in developing the norms of tax
compliance needed to support a common-interest state and that many of the
activities of the state were carried out in pursuit of adding the rather narrow
interests of public sector employees. 
3.6 Summary
I have argued that we can explain the fiscal facts that we presented above
in terms of a model of incentives to invest in fiscal capacity building. Alongside
developments in the economy, this includes changing political institutions 
and societal change which supports compliance norms and common-interest
preferences. Significant events such as the world wars reinforced this 
pattern and may well have had a “ratchet effect” in fiscal capacity building.
These developments explain why the world’s richest economies moved from
raising only around 10 per cent of national income in taxes to around 40 per
cent over a period of one hundred years. Moreover, other developments in the
role of government contributed to the prosperity that accompanied such
moves.
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It is reasonable to argue that the forces that we have identified are well-
entrenched. However, in terms of human history, the developments that I have
highlighted are extremely recent – the blink of an eye in human history. For
the remainder of the paper, I will highlight some of the contemporary and
future challenges that have a bearing on the sustainability of fiscal capacity.
The framework that I have discussed so far provides a useful lens through
which to view them.
IV BREAKING TAX SYSTEMS? CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
The canonical model of the fiscal state and its capacity to tax is based 
on a closed economy with centralised tax raising power. The first challenge 
I will discuss arises because of the international context, particularly a world
of increasing market integration. Developments in the European Union 
bring this issue into sharp relief. Both labour and capital are now mobile
raising the spectre of increasing erosion of fiscal capacity due to tax
competition. Ireland’s favourable tax regime for business has long been a sore
point among countries in Europe who see it as part of a race to the bottom.10
But so far most countries are resisting trying to match this policy. The core
assumption of traditional tax competition models has been that capital, but
not labour, is a mobile factor. But there have been significant increases in
labour mobility in recent years. The fact that France went out on a limb in its
efforts to tax the very rich further highlights the issues around human capital
mobility. The difficulty of integrating VAT tax systems with different bases
and rate structures is also a long-standing issue. The goal of market
integration in Europe seems to push ever more strongly towards an argument
for tax harmonisation. 
Issues are also arising with the importance of global businesses many of
whose assets are intellectual property, the returns to which can easily be
transferred to low tax jurisdictions. Tax havens have facilitated this and make
it feasible for many corporations to lower their tax bills significantly compared
to what they would pay were they forced to declare their profits in a single
jurisdiction. There are those who defend this, not least because it acts as a
form of fiscal “fire break” on some kinds of potential misbehaviour by
governments. However, there is little doubt that it is also eroding the fiscal
capacity of governments.  
A second challenge in Europe comes from the experience of monetary
integration among a sub-set of the economies in the European Union. This
MAKING AND BREAKING TAX SYSTEMS 315
10 Ireland is not alone with Luxemburg and the Netherlands also in the mix on this.
01 Besley article (Geary Lecture)_ESRI Vol 44-3  20/09/2013  10:13  Page 315
Eurozone monetary integration proceeded ahead of any kind of fiscal
integration and banking union whose costs have been keenly felt throughout
the recent crisis. More and more pressure has been placed on the European
Central Bank to solve the fiscal problems of Eurozone members. The growth
and stability pact looks in retrospect like a politically expedient device for
bringing about monetary union rather than as a credible institution for fiscal
restraint. And, of course, the Eurozone has no independent fiscal capacity.  
Both of these last two issues are examples of situations where inter-
jurisdictional externalities are exacerbated by the absence of tax raising
authority and coordination above the level of the nation state. But almost all
of the most important political developments in institutions that we
highlighted above are national level changes. To create supra-national fiscal
authority would require political development at that level. In the US,
political integration preceded building a federal fiscal state and the Fed was
only created once it was clear that economic integration required greater
coordination in banking policy. However, the political framework at a federal
level existed from the start. By doing this up front, there was no need to create
the political institutions once it was clear who the gainers and losers would be
from particular policies that would follow from this. There is a potential
advantage to ambiguity in this regard. The problem in Europe at the moment
is that there are large inequalities across economies and big differences in the
fiscal starting points. Policy positions of particular member states are likely to
be heavily influenced by this. The natural thought-experiment would be to
think what institutions might be created behind some kind of “veil of
ignorance”. But that is not likely to be a very good predictive model of how
negotiations proceed especially when national politicians are accountable to
their domestic constituencies. 
To mirror the kinds of development that we saw historically among nation
states, there would be a need to build a constitution with direct powers
disciplined by strong executive constraints and open competition for executive
power. This would have to break the link with national political power.
However, at present political authority in the European Union continues to
reside almost exclusively with the national governments of member states. To
parallel the history of nations would require a very significant change in this
trajectory. In the first instance, it would require EU member states to
voluntarily grant tax raising powers to the European Union. Past examples of
fiscal centralisation such as in early modern France or the United States
required a strong centre with legitimacy to override objections from those with
local fiscal capacity. There seems little prospect of that happening in the case
of the European Union: there would be a number of governments who would
strongly resist increasing the fiscal capacity of the European Union. 
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Another lesson of the framework that I have sketched is that even 
having the right institutions works better when there is a strong sense of
common interest in the relevant jurisdiction. The EU does not have
responsibility for any kind of broad-based spending programme. However, the
single-market project is arguably a major common-interest undertaking. One
policy which the EU has had a lot of influence over is the determination of
agricultural subsidies. But this constitutes a narrow redistributive
programme which benefits a specific well-defined group of economies and
individuals most. It is hardly a good starting point for building a common-
interest European state. 
So looking at the prospects for creating fiscal capacity at the EU level, the
current position is not propitious. Attempting to create a market with free
mobility undermines national fiscal capacity without there being any serious
institutional basis for centralising revenue authority.  
Returning to developments within nation states, there are a number of
looming challenges in entitlement programmes, particularly those, such as
pension programmes, which have unfunded future liabilities. Pension
programmes which promise future benefits find it easy to create a sense of
common interest when they are initially introduced because current workers
are promised future benefits and those currently old benefit immediately. But
an ageing population in mature programmes can create much more of a
redistributive tension between the young and the old. This has been brought
to the fore in some of the recent discussions about fiscal austerity and the
debate about how to contain the cost of pension entitlements. Long-term
unemployment and sickness also make some these programmes look less like
universalistic insurance programmes and more like transfer programmes. The
latter rely less on self-interest and more on altruism for their sustainability.
Some of these challenges may make it difficult to grow fiscal capacity further
to deal with funding deficits. 
Another challenge to maintaining fiscal capacity comes from its reliance
on norms of compliance. A hard and fast distinction has been made in
economics and law between tax avoidance and tax evasion with only the latter
being outside the law. But when it comes to thinking about tax morale and its
role in compliance, it is less clear-cut when assessing the harm that each of
them does. 
The UK has had a series of high profile cases affecting celebrities and
corporations where taxes have been avoided using a series of measures that,
while legal, raise issues about obligations of tax payers in the jurisdictions in
which they reside. When individuals perceive that others are not complying
with their taxes, this could encourage them to seek ways to reduce their own
liability. And there are political implications to the extent that it calls into
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question the fairness of systems of taxation. The options for tax avoidance are
open only to a relatively small set of better-off taxpayers who can benefit from
professional advice and hence undermine the idea of a common set of rules for
taxation. Whether governments are able to get to grips on this is questionable.
So far, most progress seems to come from efforts based on direct action by
concerned groups of citizens. It certainly presents a challenge to fiscal
authorities and poses a particular challenge to governments that wish to raise
a larger share of taxes from the rich and/or corporations. One corollary of this
may be a move towards even greater taxation of fixed assets like land and
property. 
Related to these developments, there are some interesting challenges
around the possibility of increasing fiscal transparency. Governments often
seem to rely on trying to raise taxes where the incidence is least clear – what
has been called “stealth taxation” in the UK debate (see IFS (2011) for a
discussion of this in a UK context). For example, the Blair government ended
some tax reliefs on pensions the consequences of which were extremely hard
to understand. On the one hand, it could be argued that efforts to raise taxes
in non-transparent ways could make it easier to raise the taxes that are
needed to fund government programmes that people want. So the net gain is
positive. But one would be uneasy about having to live in a world where the
public is permanently (and in some cases deliberately) confused; and there has
to be a concern that eventually it will bring the whole tax system into
disrepute. 
Whether governments should, therefore, try to make it even clearer what
taxes people are paying raises interesting policy issues. In an interesting field
experiment Chetty et al. (2009) showed that whether sales taxes are included
in the price or added at the till can affect responses to taxation. Some
countries insist that their citizens file a tax return every year to be reminded
of their income tax burden while others do not. These are more than
administrative issues if they affect perceptions of the tax system and hence
political debate and compliance.
Finally, there is the question of how far tax records or individuals and
corporations should be private. Some countries have made it rather easy to
observe tax records. And there is something attractive about this beyond the
bald curiosity that it nourishes. In an interesting social experiment, Norway
has been publishing all tax returns in the country on line since 2008. However,
being able to observe the tax compliance behaviour of my friends, neighbours
or enemies is not obviously conducive to greater compliance. Indeed, the
opposite could be true if there is a race to the bottom. More generally, it is clear
that modern information technology opens up these possibilities which raise
interesting challenges for the future.
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V CONCLUDING COMMENTS
So finally I return to Mark Twain. I hope to have convinced you that it is
worthwhile, if only for a few minutes, to think about the unwritten
assumptions behind the high levels of taxation that emerged in the twentieth
century. There are three core assumptions that modern tax systems are built
on:
Assumption 1: The nation state will remain central to the creation and
maintenance of fiscal capacity. 
Assumption 2: Nation states will retain a sense of common purpose
supporting broad-based tax, transfer and spending programmes. This will
continue to be reinforced by cohesive political institutions which encourage
wide political coalitions supporting a range of common interests.
Assumption 3: Socials norms that support high levels of tax compliance
will remain in place as citizens regard the system of taxation and spending to
be broadly fair. 
By making these explicit, I am not trying to convince you that these
assumptions need to be questioned. However, we should acknowledge them
and realise that making them unconsciously when we debate tax policy even
when we seem to be debating only second-order reforms and changes. If only
some of the unwritten assumptions governing issues in banking and finance
had been scrutinised in the early part of the century, there may have been
some effort to push back on some developments. And one wonders how far that
could have led to greater regulation at a time when this could have made a
difference to developments after 2008. The experience of a country, like
Canada, which avoided many of the excesses in the banking industry does
suggest a role for anticipatory regulation.   
In a nutshell, my main argument is that these assumptions are often
made implicitly and yet their validity is highly contingent. The kind of tax
analysis that economists undertake can help to reinforce their validity. For
example, studying the redistributive consequences of tax systems gets to
issues of fairness and hence can influence both political debate and norms.
Understanding tax incidence and who really pays taxes is important for
similar reasons. And promoting tax systems that are more efficient is also an
important part of debates that shape the evolution of tax systems. 
The key question for fiscal capacity is whether current levels can be
sustained (or even expanded) and how this could be achieved. I sometimes
wish that I could come back in 100, 500 or 1,000 years to see what kind of state
exists then. Only then would it become apparent whether we are indeed
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taking too much for granted by assuming that developments in the past
century will be sustained. Will nation states see a continued rise in state
capacity, a levelling off at current levels, or even perhaps a fall? Or will the
current configuration of nation states follow the logic of economic integration
in a single market place with increased political integration evolving to reflect
this. Looking at the changing maps of Europe in the past 200 years provides
an instant reminder of the fluidity and transience of political authority. Is
there any reason to think that this will be different in future? Thinking about
this requires interpreting previous developments in the forces that shape the
creation of state capacity as we have done here. 
While responding to much of this is mere conjecture, one thing is clear.
The state is now such an important and powerful player in the economy that
the fate of our descendants will surely hinge to a significant extent on how well
it performs. And, the power to tax stands at the centre of this.
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